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Judged by its initial mission, and by its influence on the problems
that inspired its creation, the Wickersham Commission (“Commission”)
created in 1929 by President Herbert Hoover was an unmitigated
failure. The President had created the Commission as an apologist for,
and in an attempt to reform, the federal law that created and
administered the prohibition of alcohol in the United States in the years
after 1919. Remembered now as the very first national commission on
crime, both its primacy and its focus are urban legends in substantial
part. It wasn’t the first national crime commission—that was appointed

* On October 4 and 5, 2012, Marquette Law School held a conference on the
Wickersham Commission—so named after its chairman, George W. Wickersham, a former
attorney general of the United States. The occasion—the 80th anniversary of the conclusion
of the Commission’s work—provided an opportunity to reflect on the federalization of law
enforcement in the intervening decades. The conference’s keynote address was the Law
School’s annual George and Margaret Barrock Lecture on Criminal Law, delivered by
Franklin E. Zimring, the William G. Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished
Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley.
** Trevor Gardner provided extensive and valuable research help in this process.
Lawrence Friedman, Samuel Walker, and Carl Zimring provided informed historical
comments on an earlier draft. Michael O’Hear proved to be a historically informed legal
scholar with helpful commentary. James Calder tutored me on historical sources for
Wickersham budgets.
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by President Calvin Coolidge in 1925. 1 And it wasn’t really created as a
national commission on crime. The lion’s share of crime is the province
of state and local government: state criminal codes and prisons, county
courts and sheriffs, and municipal police. But the primary focus of the
Wickersham Commission was on Prohibition and on the observance of
2
This not only was a guarantee that
the Federal Volstead Act.
Prohibition would remain the Commission’s central focus, but it also
provided a potential diversion from much of the illegitimacy, corruption,
and lawlessness of the local governance of crime in America.
I. INTRODUCTION: A DIFFERENT COUNTRY
The United States of 1929 was a very different nation from 1969 or
later, in ways that would have doomed any examination of crime and
law enforcement short of a very radical critique. For starters, the
United States was dominated by legal systems that were overtly racist,
ranging from Jim Crow horrors in the South to the more subtle but
pervasive forms of race discrimination in housing, education, and
miscegenation law through most of the North. And lynching was still
not an uncommon practice in much of the American South until the
middle of the 1930s—one national count averaged seventeen cases per
3
year in the decade between 1926 and 1935.
A national commission to study crime and justice thoroughly in this
era would need the likes of W. E. B. Du Bois and Norman Thomas
rather than the good Republican burghers and establishment lawyers
that manned the Wickersham Commission. And even a true blueribbon commission on Prohibition would, by the early 1930s, have had
to acknowledge that the “great experiment” was beyond any hope of
redemption. If Herbert Hoover had designed this enterprise as the
launching pad for a new, improved version of the Volstead Act, the
Commission’s task was hopeless from day one.
And not just because Hoover had appointed the wrong commission
or waited a bit too long. The changes that had overtaken the
Prohibition experiment in its short career were so profound that the
1. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Commissions, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 353, 353 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
2. The title of the Commission, National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, was an obvious euphemism for Prohibition.
3. See Lynchings, By Year and Race, 1882–1968, THE CHARLES CHESNUTT DIGITAL
ARCHIVE, available at http://www.chesnuttarchive.org/classroom/lynching_table_year.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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nation that had created the push for Prohibition was not the same nation
in which the experiment was conducted. The temperance movement
had its roots in an America of towns and rural areas, the United States
4
of the turn of the twentieth century. Most of the nation’s population
lived outside urban areas in 1900, and much of the population in rural
areas and small towns feared and distrusted the big cities, which were
expanding dramatically with industrialization, and the surge of
immigration that greatly diversified the national landscape between
1890 and 1920. The 1920 census was the first time that the number of
persons living in urban areas equaled the number living in rural areas.
So the occasion for this conference in 2012 is a bit of a mystery.
How did this hopeless venture end up being viewed as a precedentsetting and positive contribution to the ways in which the national
government learns about crime and criminal justice? I will provide my
take on this question in three installments. Part II will describe how the
Commission was structured and staffed and the broad ambitions of the
Commission’s work on crime, police, and prosecution. Part III will
propose four important innovations in Wickersham that later
commission efforts adopted. And Part IV will consider governmental
alternatives to blue-ribbon commissions and how they have functioned
in recent history.
II. FUTILITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION
I suspect that the impossibility of the Commission’s original mandate
may have helped to remake it into the enterprise we remember and
honor. Unlike the Coolidge Administration’s slapdash commission on
crime in the mid-20s, the Wickersham effort had significant financial
resources—the initial budget of $250,000 in 1930 dollars was quite
substantial, and the final expenditure, close to $500,000, was the
5
inflation-adjusted equivalent of just under $7 million in 2012. President
Hoover and many of its members considered it an important

4. See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986).

STATUS POLITICS AND

5. For Wickersham funding, see JAMES D. CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT HOOVER’S INITIATIVES 84 (1993) (noting
the initial budget), and Senate Yields on Wickersham Fund; Votes All, CHI. TRIB., July 4,
1930, at 2 (indicating the final budget). The Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation Calculator
demonstrates that $1 in 1930 is worth $13.75 in 2012. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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undertaking. The commitment of Hoover to science and empirical data
probably motivated the resources that made Wickersham more than a
gesture. The resources and standing of this blue-ribbon institution
became an opportunity for sustained analysis of issues and phenomena
tangentially related to Prohibition and the federal criminal justice
system, issues such as crime and criminal justice in the broader
American landscape.
The substantial resources available to the Wickersham Commission
provided the opportunity to avoid one of the central academic
complaints that greeted the early Coolidge Commission, that the
6
commission lacked “expert knowledge” and “special experience.”
What the Coolidge Commission lacked was a staff and therefore any
substantive research. With financial resources, the new Wickersham
Commission could employ a staff and fund papers by expert consultants.
And this the Wickersham Commission did with precedent-setting
energy. The vast majority of the consultant papers published by the
Commission were not about Prohibition or its enforcement but about
crime and criminal justice. Both the methodology of Wickersham in
generating expert reports and the volumes produced by the
Commission’s experts are the enduring legacy of Wickersham.
Depending on experts and deferring to expert judgment had profound
impact not only on how commissions did their work but also on the
substance of commission reports. This was the key innovation of the
commission, what I shall call the “Wickersham model.” And this
methodological legacy had a substantial impact on the many
commissions that used methods close to the Wickersham model a
generation later in the golden age of national commissions.
With very few exceptions, the Wickersham Commissioners were not
radical progressives, but the staff and consultants that produced
Wickersham’s reports were emerging and established pantheons of
7
social science (Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay ), social services
8
9
(Miriam Van Waters and Edith Abbott ), and the legal academy
6. John H. Wigmore, Editorial, The National Crime Commission: What Will It Achieve?,
16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 312, 312–13 (1925).
7. See generally CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENTS IN RELATION TO
DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (1942);
CLIFFORD R. SHAW & MAURICE E. MOORE, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A DELINQUENT
CAREER (1931).
8. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, MATERNAL JUSTICE: MIRIAM VAN WATERS AND THE
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(Zechariah Chafee 10 and Sam Bass Warner 11). Only two of the eleven
12
13
commissioners were academics (Roscoe Pound and Ada Comstock ),
but the lion’s share of the staff reports that are the permanent record of
the commission are the work of academics and reform-oriented lawyers.
Figure 1: Median Age in 1929 of Commissioners Compared to Staff and
14
Consultants, Wickersham Commission

One other important contrast between staff members and
consultants on the one hand and commissioners on the other was
demographic. The median age of thirteen authors or coauthors of

FEMALE REFORM TRADITION 57–58 (1996).
9. See Mary Jo Deegan & Michael R. Hill, Edith Abbot, in WOMEN IN SOCIOLOGY: A
BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 29, 29–31 (Mary Jo Deegan ed., 1991).
10. See DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND
LAW 1 (1986).
11. See, e.g., Sam Bass Warner, Creating a Plan for Criminal Court Statistics, 14 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y. 88, 88 (1930).
12. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Future of Law, 47 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1937).
13. See, e.g., Susan Margot Smith, Ada Comstock Notestein: Educator, in WOMEN OF
MINNESOTA: SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS 208, 214–16 (Barbara Stuhler & Gretchen
Kreuter eds., rev. ed. 1998). See generally ADA LOUISE COMSTOCK, THE EVOLUTION OF AN
EDUCATOR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PUBLISHED WRITINGS OF ADA LOUISE COMSTOCK
(Barbara Miller Solomon ed., 1987).
14. Trevor Gardner computed ages for all members of the Commission from published
sources and for the following thirteen staff and consultants: McKay (28), C. Shaw (29), S.
Simpson (31), R. Oppenheimer (31), C. Wilcox (31), B. Smith (37), M. Van Waters (41),
W.H. Pollack (42), Z. Chaffee (44), H. Dennison (52), E. Abbott (52), A. Volmer (53), and H.
Hart (78).
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staff/consultant volumes was forty-one, and only four of the thirteen
were over age forty-five in 1929 when the venture was launched. By
contrast, the median age in 1929 of the eleven members of the
commission was fifty-eight, and only one member was under fifty when
appointed.
The generational difference between staff and members and the
academic orientation of the experts writing reports made the emphasis
on staff effort into a shift from an older, establishment, practitioner
orientation (perhaps still reflected in brief commission reports) to the
lengthy, empirical studies of the social scientists and the reform-oriented
briefs of the policy-oriented lawyers.
The two reports on Prohibition that were separately issued in
January 1931 might have been an arresting example of the difference in
tone between commissioners and staff experts. The two reports
combined extensive and powerfully written observations of the costs
and ineffectiveness of Prohibition in the 1920s with a rather
unenthusiastic endorsement of continued efforts to modify and improve
Prohibition itself.
Franklin P. Adams famously celebrated this mixed message in a
brief poem, the only published poetic critique of national commission
output that I have encountered:
Prohibition is an awful flop.
We like it.
It can’t stop what it’s meant to stop.
We like it.
It’s left a trail of graft and slime.
It don’t prohibit worth a dime.
It’s filled our land with vice and crime.
15
Nevertheless, we’re for it.
Part of the dissonance of these reports’ findings and their
conclusions must be attributed to the need to respect Herbert Hoover’s
15. Todd Shepherd, Michigan’s Wine Shipping Restrictions: A Valid Use of Twenty-First
Amendment Control or Sleight of Hand Legislation Discriminating Against the Free Market?,
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 583, 589 n.65 (2011) (quoting Franklin P. Adams, The
Wickersham Report, N.Y. WORLD (1931)). Lawrence Friedman reported to me that the
Franklin P. Adams ditty was adopted from an earlier ditty that begins: “Tobacco is a dirty
weed/I like it,” often attributed to Graham Lee Hemminger in a college humor magazine.
History, PHROTH, http://www.phroth.com/history/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that
Hemminger wrote the poem in 1915 for the predecessor to Phroth, Froth, a Penn State humor
magazine).
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wishes. But why then the hard-hitting analysis of costs? Perhaps this
came in part from the influence of staff on this documented history,
since staff did most of the work and much of the writing. And the
documentation in the 1931 report was integrated into the arguments for
repeal that were a major theme in the two years after it was issued. The
report is credited by later observers with aiding the cause of repeal.
After the January 1931 release of the Prohibition materials, the next
release of Wickersham reports came in late April (crime statistics), with
the next eleven volumes being issued between June 7 and August 23,
1931.
Figure 2: Length of Reports and Extent of Press Coverage, 14 Wickersham
16
Volumes (1931)

The figure below illustrates the uneven patterns of public attention
to the work product of the commission. The New York Times published
17
a word count of all the commission’s publications in August of 1931,
which the figure below compares to level of news coverage provided by
16. Word counts of reports, computed in The New York Times, August 24, 1931. Id.
Press coverage (words devoted to Prohibition reports in the week after publication, The New
York Times) count by Trevor Gardner. I do not include the one report the staff wrote and
the Commission did not publish—a re-examination of a notorious 1916 case privately
published in 1932. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. ET AL., THE MOONEY-BILLINGS REPORT:
SUPPRESSED BY THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION (1932).
17. Wickersham Slate Finally Is Cleared, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1931, at 2.
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the Times in the week after reports were issued.
While the Prohibition reports were less than 5% of the published
product of the Commission and only two of its fourteen reports, they
received the majority of immediate public attention. The Prohibition
reports accounted for more than three-quarters of the verbiage on
Wickersham in the New York Times. While none of the other reports
generated more than a small fraction of the ink of the Prohibition
materials, the distribution of attention to the rest of the reports did
reflect the appetite for controversy and scandal. The report on
lawlessness in law enforcement got twice as much coverage as the next
most-discussed non-Prohibition report (6,932 words versus 3,626 for the
volume on prosecution).
The more important contrast is that
“lawlessness” in law enforcement got more than ten times the attention
that was accorded to the other report on police which was released
earlier. Even before electronic journalism, there was evidence of the
adage, “if it bleeds, it leads.”
What was to eventually commend this effort as a model of
governmental research in crime and criminal justice was not what
commanded public notice in the early 1930s.
III. THE WICKERSHAM MODEL: FOUR ELEMENTS
The Wickersham Commission is not normally regarded as a major
landmark in the march toward the repeal of Prohibition. A recent
history of the end of Prohibition, Last Call (2011), has only three
references to the Commission’s work in its index and regards the reports
as of minor influence. 18 But Wickersham had more influence on the
methods and functions of national commissions. When I speak of the
“legacies” of the Wickersham exercise, I am trying to identify four ways
in which the structure and focus of this early commission of inquiry set
precedents that can be observed in the cluster of national commissions
that operated a generation later in the United States.
I stop short of demonstrating that the similarity in structure was a
clear case of cause and effect. The four features of interest in this
regard are (1) staff dominance, (2) an emphasis on empirical research,
(3) a preference for long-range perspective instead of targeting a finite
number of discrete policy proposals, and (4) an explanatory and
retrospective orientation that often makes such reports into ceremonies
18. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 320, 334, 351,
467 (2010).
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of adjustment to changes that have already happened rather than
proponents of change.
A. Staff Dominance
The formal relationship between commissioners and staff in
Wickersham and all other such bodies is hierarchical—the commission
selects the staff and the staff works for the commission. But, in fact,
once the staff members have been selected by the commission, they tend
to exercise considerable power over the work of a commission. There
are three features that maximize the impact of staff in Wickersham and
every other American effort I know of—numbers, expertise, and
authorship. In a well-funded exercise like Wickersham, there are more
staff than commissioners, and the staff may also devote more time to the
enterprise than persons nominated to commission status because of the
latter’s other prominent positions, which will often restrict their
participation in commission efforts. The two academics on the
Wickersham Commission were both busy administrators—the dean of a
law school and the president of a college. The academics on staff were
presumably less preoccupied with administrative duties.
Then there is the matter of expertise. The staff were selected for
their expertise in specific areas—August Vollmer for law enforcement,
Edith Abbott for immigrants and crime, Miriam Van Waters for young
offenders, etc., so that their credentials created substantial influence.
Finally, in American commissions, it is the staff who write most of
the official prose. All but one of the enormous subject-matter reports of
Wickersham were authored by staff (the apparent exception being The
Causes of Crime tome), and staff reports visibly dominate the output of
19
20
the commissions on crime (1967) and on violence (1969). The author
of a report generates what real estate agents call “sweat equity” for
determining the substance of the report. If you write the report, you
have real influences on what it says.
So the power of commissioners and senior staff is extremely
important at the front end of the commission process—because they
determine who will staff the process. But once an expert staff has been
19. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 311–12 (1967) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE].
20. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, TO
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: FINAL REPORT, at xvi–xix (1969)
[hereinafter U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE].
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selected, the balance of power shifts to the staff.
The most prominent exception to that U.S. commission pattern of
staff dominance is quite consistent with the influence of authorship on
outcome. During the era of government commissions on pornography,
the British Home Office appointed a committee chaired by Professor
Bernard Williams, a moral philosopher from Cambridge University.
This low-budget committee was of exceptionally high intellectual
quality, and Bernard Williams, the committee chair, wrote much of the
21
report.
All of my short list of the causes of staff dominance were on display
in the Wickersham experience and would become also the pattern of
operation in the commissions of the 1960s and 1970s. This may not be
the result of later efforts explicitly modeling themselves on Wickersham
so much as the natural result of the same processes that produced staff
influence in 1930 doing so again in the U.S. commissions on crime,
violence, and pornography. Either way, the Wickersham Commission
was a preview of coming attractions for the national commissions that
followed.
B. An Emphasis on Empirics
The Wickersham Commission produced fourteen volumes, a total of
1.6 million words. We have already seen that 95% of that verbiage
22
didn’t directly concern Prohibition. But what types of perspective and
ambition produced this verbal landslide? To impose a verbal construct
from the current era, what Wickersham became was the first “datadriven” analysis of issues in crime and justice by a governmental
commission in the United States. And the staff dominance I just
mentioned was an important cause of this emphasis on empirics in two
senses. The academics and reform-oriented lawyers who were on staff
believed in empirical research, and they had the time and energy to
gather the data and write the reports. So the Commission was datadriven because the staff were data-driven. And this was a feature of
most if not all of the policy commissions on crime and violence that
were clustered in the 1960s and early 1970s.

21. See GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE
SOCIETY 10–13 (1988).
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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C. Taking the Long View
One other feature of the Wickersham endeavor that has been
repeated in later efforts is an emphasis on long-range perspectives
rather than specific, discrete policy choices. On almost all the topics
considered, the aim of the reports produced was to comprehend the
phenomena and systems being considered rather than to focus on
arguments for specific policy change (the possible exception here is
criminal statistics). The emphasis in Wickersham on perspective rather
than a specific policy program was overdetermined. President Hoover’s
position on Prohibition certainly wasn’t broadly popular with either
commissioners or staff. And everything the staff reported on the
problematics of enforcement in Prohibition pointed in the opposite
direction from Hoover’s hopes. Perspective was the only refuge in the
extraordinarily complicated politics of Prohibition in 1931.
And most of the other social science topics considered by
Wickersham staff reports—crime and immigration, juvenile
delinquency, the impact of disorganized city neighborhoods on crime
rates—were efforts to create broad understanding rather than to
mobilize legal change. On the procedural side of the Commission’s
agenda, for topics such as police corruption and the third degree, it was
the level of government of this federal Commission rather than the lack
of a policy agenda that restrained the Commission’s action agenda.
There were no direct levers available to the national government in
1931, such as federal financial aid or constitutionally based reversals of
state criminal convictions as carrot or stick for state and local
compliance with federal standards. Shortly after Wickersham, one of its
staff lawyers, Walter Pollak, argued the winning side of Powell v.
23
the beginning of federal court controls on state
Alabama (1932),
criminal process.
More striking than the orientation to perspective that Wickersham
adopted is the fact that most of the later commissions also favored broad
understanding and policy instead of centering attention on a specific
reform. The 1967 crime commission, generally regarded as the most
successful of the genre, was organized around long-term development in
areas such as police, crime statistics, juvenile justice, and organized
24
crime. Both the civil disorder (Kerner) and violence (Eisenhower)
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 47, 49–50, 73 (1932).
24. See generally PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 19.
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commissions argued for enormous changes in American society and
government, but each was committed to change of such breadth that no
25
specific law or session of a legislature could serve as a focus of activity.
At the other end of the spectrum, there were commissions on
pornography and gambling that did not seem intent on arguing for any
26
sharp changes in policy.
There have been, in other words, very large differences in the
orientation of national commissions to social and legal change, yet an
overarching similarity in the sense that no commission report in the
modern era was centered on a finite list of specific changes as the core of
an action agenda.
D. The Commission as Ceremony of Adjustment
The central inconsistency identified in the Franklin P. Adams poem
27
about Wickersham was the sustained documentation of the failures
and social cost of Prohibition combined with the absence of any explicit
recommendation by the Commission to repeal the Prohibition
amendment and legislation.
But a more generous reading of
Wickersham’s work on Prohibition is that its extensive documentation
of cost and ineffectiveness provided a foundation for many supporters of
Prohibition to accept the inevitable repeal of Prohibition two years later
when it came. In this sense, the Commission’s fact finding was much
more important than its divided and convoluted policy
recommendations.
Further, if this is an accurate reading of
Wickersham’s historic function on Prohibition, then it was an important
precedent for another common function of later national commissions—
what can be called the creation of a ceremony of acceptance and social
adjustment to changes that are taking place.
The most remarkable example of this “ceremony of adjustment”
function relates to the commissions of inquiry on pornography that
popped up all over the developed world after the late 1960s. The
United States had a national commission in the late 1960s that reported
28
29
in 1970. Great Britain had one that reported in 1979. Canada had a
25. See generally U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
(1968); U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, supra note
20.
26. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
REGULATION OF VICE 473–513, 545–633 (2007).
27. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
28. HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 7–10.
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Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution in 1985, 30 and
Attorney General Edwin Meese commissioned a second report on
31
pornography in the United States that reported in 1986.
And what did all these commissions recommend as legislative
action? Not much at all. Because that wasn’t the primary social and
political function of the inquiries. Most of the commissions followed
rather than preceded the widespread availability of pornography. Only
the 1970 Pornography Commission was issued prior to the theatrical
32
release of Deep Throat in the United States (1972). The commissions
were investigations of the effect of a new status quo that was emerging
in most developed countries—all the social science was intended to
reassure publics that Western civilization could survive Debbie Does
33
Dallas. Even the Meese Commission, created to reassure conservative
constituencies that pornography was harmful and objectionable, did not
urge broad legal change but was, rather, an attempt to discredit the
34
moral claims of liberals. And the National Commission on Gambling
in the 1990s was similarly more concerned with regarding the growth of
gambling as survivable than with advocating any path-breaking legal
changes.
In its own precedent-setting and peculiar fashion, perhaps the
Wickersham Commission’s mixed teachings on Prohibition were an
attempt to explain and justify the formal undoing of alcohol Prohibition
that was by then looming on the American horizon.
IV. THE COMMISSION THAT NEVER WAS
The cluster of national commissions that reported on problems of
crime and violence in the 1960s and 1970s is now itself a generation or
more removed from contemporary American government and public
policy discourse. There are, to be sure, a number of commissions of
inquiry appointed by federal and state governments to consider
particular subjects—and some of the topics come close to crime and
violence. But we had no national commission on school violence in the
wake of Columbine to parallel the Eisenhower Commission on Violence
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 25, 227.
Id. at 13–16.
DEEP THROAT (Gerard Darniano Film Productions 1972).
DEBBIE DOES DALLAS (School Day Films 1978).
HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 13–15.
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(1969) 35 and the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder (1968). 36 (The
commission to investigate the September 11 disaster is the exception
that proves the rule on this: it was a body, like the Warren Commission,
asked to confirm an official historical account and not consulted for
policy.)
It appears that what I would call a broad national commission
approach to survey policy options in areas such as crime, drugs,
violence, and race has passed from the American scene. The last major
attempt that I would put in this category was President Clinton’s
37
“Initiative on Race.” And that isolated effort came two decades after
any sustained use of commissions of inquiry about crime policy. Why?
There are two alternative explanations for the decline of the national
policy commission. One theory is the commission departed because it
failed as a useful enterprise. The other theory is that commissions came
to be regarded as a threat to governmental policy orthodoxy. The most
important evidence that the day of the national commission had passed
by the late 1980s concerns the drug emergency and the public moral
panic over drugs during the decade after 1985. That decade witnessed
the ascendance of drugs to number one on a list of citizen-nominated
“most serious problems” nationally, multiple layers of federal and state
legislation, the creation of a national drug control agency with a drug
czar, and annual editions of a glossy national drug control “strategy” to
38
energize and reassure the population.
Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed almost everything a
government is expected to do with novel and threatening problems
except appointment of a high-level national commission on drug policy,
and this trend was hardly an accident. The annual report of the nation’s
drug czar was designed as the opposite of a national or citizens’
commission; it was an official document under the control of the
35. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, supra
note 20.
36. U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 25. The
Commission to represent the September 11 disaster is the exception that proves the rule on
this. It was a body like the Warren Report asked to confirm an official historical account and
not consulted for policy. See generally THE NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES: THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004).
37. See ADVISORY BOARD’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE (1998).
38. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL (1992).
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executive branch policy makers in the field. It was, to borrow a phrase
39
A presidential
from a famous Argentine film, The Official Story.
commission of any degree of independence was probably considered too
great a risk to generate unwelcome conclusions. In that same pattern as
Marquette Law Professor Michael O’Hear has reminded me, the federal
sentencing commission created in the 1980s keeps empirical evaluations
of sentencing as “in house” efforts rather than tolerating external
review.
The absence of a real national commission on drugs did not escape
public notice. Walter Cronkite, near the end of a long and distinguished
career in news reporting and analysis, concluded an hour-long special
broadcast on drugs in 1995 with the following:
It seems to this reporter that the time has come for President
Clinton to do what President Hoover did when Prohibition was
tearing the nation apart: appoint a bipartisan commission of
distinguished citizens, . . . a blue-ribbon panel to reappraise our
drug policy right down to its very core with a commission with
full investigative authority and the prestige and power to
override bureaucratic concerns and political considerations, . . .
and present a comprehensive drug policy for the future. 40
Cronkite’s view of the Wickersham Commission was informed by
nostalgic distortions of epic proportions. After all, a majority of the
commissioners had maintained their support of the Eighteenth
Amendment.
But more than nostalgia suggests that a Wickersham-style analysis of
the War on Drugs in 1990 or 1995 (or ever) might have destabilized the
major elements of drug Prohibition for at least an important segment of
the public and would hasten rather than retard the pace of policy
change. And there is support in the history of Wickersham for this view.
The pro forma support of Prohibition by most commissioners did not
count for much in public or legislative opinion. The powerful factfinding in the report on Prohibition probably had greater impact. Much
as the Franklin P. Adams poem quoted earlier may have been intended
to make fun of the commission, the poem accurately portrayed a mixed
39. THE OFFICIAL STORY (Historias Cinematograficas Cinemania 1985).
40. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 14–15 (2d ed. 2012) (quoting
The Cronkite Report—The Drug Dilemma: War or Peace? (Discovery Channel television
broadcast June 1995)).
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message that many on the commission staff and some commissioners
wanted to make a part of the public record of the Prohibition
experience. Any such forceful cost accounting of the modern war on
drugs would provide little comfort to the drug control authorities.
Whatever its flaws, the candor and balance of Wickersham on
Prohibition enforcement makes William Bennett’s first National Drug
Control Strategy look like the front page of Soviet-era Pravda by
41
comparison.
While the absence of a national commission on drugs in the late
1980s makes it clear that the age of the presidential commission on crisis
problems in crime had passed, what is less clear is whether the drug
emergency of the mid-1980s played an important role in pushing
commissions off the national agenda or whether the lack of a 1980s drug
commission was merely a result of the fact that the age of “policy”
commissions on crime had already come to an end.
Either way, the drug warriors of the 1990s would have been right to
fear the impact of a national commission. No matter their biases and
political sensitivities, the staff and the members of such commissions
usually have a commitment to fact gathering and to the importance of
their problem in the larger national landscape. Perhaps we overdosed
on national commissions in the era of Warren, Katzenbach, Kerner, and
Eisenhower, or perhaps we tended to overstate the acuteness of the
problems put before commission bodies and to call for too many
resources and too much change to remedy these selected national
problems. But in a political system and public consciousness that find
problems easy to ignore, sustained attention on important chronic
problems will often serve the public good.
V. A DANGEROUS THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
One interesting test of the value and limits of commissions of inquiry
as a public policy tool is a “thought experiment” along the lines
suggested by Walter Cronkite. 42 Imagine that President Clinton had
appointed a national commission on drug control in 1997 (prudence
suggests the year after rather than the year before a presidential
41. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at Chapter 1. Michael O’Hear has reminded
me of another place where a government agency has supplanted independent fact-finding
with research and evaluation under the control of the agency it should evaluate: the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. Here, too, the monopoly of in-house research generates selfpromotion to a problematic degree.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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election). What sorts of questions might such a body have asked? What
sorts of research might have emerged? What types of policy changes
might this commission have considered and recommended? What
short-range and longer-range policy changes might have occurred in its
wake?
Like many thought experiments, there is considerable room for
different assumptions and presumed effects in the future that we are
asked to imagine in my Cronkite commission experiment. And it is easy
to use a mythical national commission as a magical mechanism that will
change public prejudices and overcome persistent political logjams.
Walter Cronkite seemed to be hoping for some such magical
43
transformation with his televised plea in 1995.
My own view of the impact of our imaginary drug commission is
much less optimistic than Cronkite’s but still leaves ample room to see a
National Commission on Drug Control as a public benefit well worth its
modest costs.
It could settle some factual questions, resolve
disagreements about costs and outcome of public programs, and clarify
difficult choices. It could outline the nature of the drug problems we
had best learn to live with and perhaps identify other problems that are
not inherently part of government’s ongoing involvement in drugs.
It could do many of the modest but important things that the
Wickersham staff and commissioners accomplished in 1931. And that,
in my judgment, would be a considerable improvement on the public
relations puffery that executive government now manufactures. The
commission of inquiry model that Wickersham brought to American
crime and criminal justice probably served the public interest far better
than some of its recent alternatives. If so, this conference is well-timed
for serious students of the American future.

43. Id.

